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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is a tribute to Professor Gabriel M. Wilner. As a true citizen
of the world, and concerned about its future, Professor Wilner dedicated
himself to international development and to improving international
economic and social justice. For all of us who had the honor of participating
in Professor Wilner’s seminars on the law of international economic
development in the LL.M. Program on International Legal Cooperation at the
Vrije Universiteit Brussel—where he taught from 1976 to 2004—his
commitment to the progressive development of international law will remain
an inspiration. As a teacher, Professor Wilner worked in the tradition of his
Columbia Law School mentor, Wolfgang Friedmann, with whom he had
collaborated on parts of the landmark book The Changing Structure of
International Law.1 A proponent of the “law in context” approach, Professor
Wilner’s seminars constituted an eye-opener to the global economic and
political sea changes of the time and their impact on the development of
world law. Thanks to a wealth of experience as former member of the UN
Office of Legal Affairs, former Legal Officer at the UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), and legal consultant at the UN Commission
on Transnational Corporations, Professor Wilner brought to the classroom a
unique insight into the law and diplomacy of international economic
relations.
Professor Wilner’s influence on his students at the Vrije Universiteit
Brussel went well beyond the field of international law. Year after year, he
motivated and assisted students to become active members of the
transatlantic community and to continue their education in the United States.
In the same spirit, and in his capacity as Associate Dean of Graduate Legal
Studies at the University of Georgia School of Law, he offered young
colleagues at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel the unique opportunity of
teaching European Union (EU) law in Athens, Georgia, while also inviting
them to join the faculty of his long-running Brussels Seminar on the Law and
Policy of the EU. All those who—like myself—have benefited from these
opportunities, owe Professor Wilner a great debt of gratitude. As a
warmhearted teacher and mentor, generous friend, and great humanist,

1

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964).
Professor Wilner was also the principal editor of a volume of essays in honor of Professor
Friedmann, JUS ET SOCIETAS: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN (Gabriel M.
Wilner ed., 1979).
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Professor Wilner’s memory will live among the generations of students and
colleagues on all continents whom he motivated, helped, and inspired.
In light of Professor Wilner’s longstanding interest and teaching activities
in EU law, and his concentration on international economic relations, this
Article will focus on the EU’s international trade competences after the
Treaty of Lisbon.2 The EU’s external trade policy, or common commercial
policy (CCP) as it is called in the EU’s Treaty language, belongs to the EU’s
exclusive competences.3 However, its precise scope has been the subject of
a decades-long legal and political debate.4 The main causes of this
seemingly endless discussion have been: (a) the poor drafting of the original
EEC Treaty Article on the CCP;5 (b) the decades of resistance by the
Member States to accept the EU as a single actor in international trade that is
empowered to conclude comprehensive and modern international trade

2

Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].
To obtain a full picture of the currently applicable EU primary law, consult the Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter
TEU], and the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
3
See infra Part II. The numbering of the relevant Treaty Article on the CCP has changed
over time. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], incorporated the CCP competences and procedures in
its Article 113. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related
Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam], the original
Article 113 was renumbered as Article 133 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173 [hereinafter EC
Treaty (Amsterdam)]. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, supra note 2, Article
133 was renumbered to Article 207 of TFEU, supra note 2.
4
See generally Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, External Relations Powers of the European
Community, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S149 (1999) (discussing how poor drafting and
interpretive problems have led to debate over the common commercial policy provision); see
also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Is EC Trade Policy up to Par?: A Legal Analysis over Time – Rome
Marrakesh, Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional Treaty, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 305, 305
(2007) (providing analysis of the “evolution of the EC’s common commercial policy
competence” over time).
5
See generally Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The Common Commercial Policy—Scope and
Nature of the Powers, in PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 3 (E.L.M. Völker
ed., 1987); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Scope of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, in ETUDES
DE DROIT DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES: MÉLANGES OFFERTS À PIERRE-HENRI TEITGEN
147 (Philippe Manin et al. eds., 1984); Stephen Woolcock, Trade Policy: A Further Shift
Towards Brussels, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 384 (Helen Wallace et al. eds.,
6th ed. 2010).
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agreements without the need for separate Member State ratifications;6 and (c)
the failure of the European Court of Justice to give a logical and coherent
follow-up to its initial broad definition of the CCP.7 In 1994, Takis Tridimas
and Piet Eeckhout accurately noted that, although the Court “has made broad
statements of principle, it has been singularly reluctant to draw from them
what may seem to be their logical consequences.”8
The question of the scope of the CCP and its delimitation of competences
is of constitutional significance for two main reasons.9 First, the EU has
conferred powers only.10 Before it can conclude an international trade
agreement, the EU must tie that agreement to its own primary law (i.e., to a
provision in one of the EU Treaties) that empowers it to approve the
agreement.11 On several occasions, a restrictive interpretation of the scope of
the EU’s primary law has resulted in the conclusion that the EU Treaties do
not confer sufficiently comprehensive competence on the EU to ratify an
agreement in its entirety.12 As competences not conferred upon the EU in the
6
See generally SOPHIE MEUNIER, TRADING VOICES: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS (2005); Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis,
The European Union As a Conflicted Trade Power, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 906 (2006); Sophie
Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, The European Union As a Trade Power, in INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 247 (Christopher Hill & Michael Smith eds., 2005)
[hereinafter The European Union As a Trade Power] (describing the derivation of the EU’s
inherent power through trade).
7
Some commentators have given broader negative opinions on the Court’s jurisprudence
in the field of the EU´s external relations competences. See PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW 85 (2006) (“[T]here is something deeply troubling about the
lack of clarity and consistency of the line of reasoning followed [by the Court in the landmark
case on implied external powers].”); see also David L. Scannell, Trespassing on Sacred
Ground: The Implied External Competence of the European Community, 4 CAMBRIDGE Y.B.
EUR. L. STUD. 343, 345 (2001) (“[T]he language employed by the Court . . . has not been
conduceive to legal certainty.”).
8
Takis Tridimas & Piet Eeckhout, The External Competence of the Community and the
Case-Law of the Court of Justice: Principle Versus Pragmatism, 14 Y.B. EUR. L. 143, 172
(1994).
9
This question is analogous to that addressed in the European Court of Justice’s Opinion
2/00 where it attributed a constitutional significance to the choice of the legal base. Opinion
2/00, 2001 E.C.R. I-9713, para. 5.
10
Id.; TEU, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
11
Opinion 2/00, para. 5.
12
See generally Marise Cremona, Defining Competence in EU External Relations: Lessons
from the Treaty Reform Process, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SALIENT
FEATURES OF A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 34, 38–42 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds.,
2008); Panos Koutrakos, Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU External
Relations, in EU FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 171–98 (Marise
Cremona & Bruno de Witte eds., 2008).
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Treaties remain with the Member States, agreements that come partly under
the EU´s CCP and partly within the competence of the Member States (socalled mixed trade agreements) also require the joint ratification of each of
the Member States.13 The ratification of an agreement by all twenty-seven
EU Member States, in addition to its conclusion by the EU, is a cumbersome
process that creates multiple legal problems.14 At this moment, around three
years typically pass between the signature and the ratification of mixed
agreements by the EU and its Member States.15 Logically, the European
Commission—the EU institution charged with promoting the general interest
of the EU—has argued over the years for a broad interpretation of the CCP
in order to avoid the complexity of mixed agreements, while the Member
States, together with the EU’s Council of Ministers, have often insisted on
remaining directly involved in the conclusion of international trade
agreements.16
Second, the competence question has consequences for the EU
decisionmaking procedure.17 At the negotiation stage of international
agreements, those agreements that fall under the CCP are negotiated by the
European Commission as a single actor, working on behalf of the EU as a
13
TEU, supra note 2, art. 5(2). The practice that mixed trade agreements “shall be
concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States” was explicitly written in the
Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 (C 80) 1. The same
phrase is also found in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community art. 133(6), Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) [hereinafter EC Treaty (Nice)].
This provision is no longer present in the currently applicable TFEU, supra note 2.
14
See generally MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE
WORLD (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) [hereinafter MIXED AGREEMENTS
REVISITED] (providing an up-to-date overview of legal questions related to EU mixed
agreements); MIXED AGREEMENTS (David O’Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1983) (the
landmark study that raised academic attention to the topic of EU mixed agreements in 1983);
LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES: QUELLES PERSPECTIVES? (Jacques
H.J. Bourgeois et al. eds., 1997) (providing interesting perspectives by practitioners and
academics).
15
Frank Hoffmeister, Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the
European Union and Its Member States, in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra note 14, at
249, 256. Judge Christiaan Timmermans of the European Court of Justice remarked that
mixed agreements notably entail the risk “that a Member State might use the necessary
approval of a mixed agreement as leverage to obtain concessions in other fields.” Christiaan
Timmermans, Opening Remarks—Evolution of Mixity Since the Leiden 1982 Conference, in
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra note 14, at 1, 7.
16
See MEUNIER, supra note 6 (providing a detailed study of EU decisionmaking in trade
policy and the practical cosequences of mixity).
17
Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. I-9713, para. 5.
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whole.18 In the pre-Lisbon Treaty era, multilateral agreements that include
trade provisions, but also other objectives that fall partly within the shared
competence of the Member States (such as environmental protection), were
often negotiated by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, together with
the Commission.19 The Treaty of Lisbon now explicitly stipulates that the
Commission shall ensure the EU’s entire external representation (except for
the Common Foreign and Security Policy—CFSP).20 This provision can be
interpreted to include the negotiation of agreements that cover shared
competences. Nevertheless, the Member States seem determined to continue
the practice of having mixed agreements negotiated, at least partly, by the
Council Presidency.21
At the conclusion stage of international agreements, the Council of
Ministers can, in general, act with a qualified majority voting in favor of
agreements under the CCP, after consultation of the European Parliament or
after having obtained its consent.22 However, trade agreements of a “mixed”
nature, involving the shared competences of the Member States, require the
“common accord of the Member States,” thus preventing majority decisiontaking.23 This is an additional reason that has motivated the European
Commission to favor a broad interpretation of the CCP’s scope, while the
Member States have been keen on maintaining their veto right.24
18
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(3); Frank Hoffmeister, The Contribution of EU Practice to
International Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 37, 49–50 (Marise
Cremona ed., 2008); The European Union As a Trade Power, supra note 6, at 254–57;
Woolcock, supra note 5, at 388–89.
19
Hoffmeister, supra note 15, at 253–55; see also Hoffmeister, supra note 18, at 53.
20
TEU, supra note 2, art. 17(1).
21
As shown in the articles cited below, this was illustrated by the difficulties over EU
representation on international environmental negotiations following the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon. Jennifer Rankin, Row over Who Gets to Take Charge at Environment Talks,
EUROPEANVOICE.COM (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/rowover-who-gets-to-take-charge-at-environment-talks/67677.aspx; Jennifer Rankin, Row over Who
Provides the EU’s ‘One Voice,’ EUROPEANVOICE.COM (May 20, 2010), http://www.europeanvoi
ce.com/article/imported/row-over-who-provides-the-eu-s-one-voice-/67997.aspx; Jennifer
Rankin, Commission Defends Lead Role in International Talks, EUROPEANVOICE.COM (June 24,
2010), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/commission-defends-lead-role-ininternational-talks-/68324.aspx; Anne Eckstein, Mercury: Running Battle Between Council and
Commission, E UROPOLITICS (May 25, 2010), http://www.europolitics.info/sectorialpolicies/mercury-running-battle-between-council-and-commission-art272673-15.html.
22
TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 207(3)–(4), 218(6).
23
The practice that mixed trade agreements require the common accord of the Member
States was written into the EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, art. 133(6). This provision is no
longer present in the currently applicable TFEU. Hoffmeister, supra note 15, at 256–57.
24
See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text for a variety of cases illustrating this
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Against this background, the main purpose of this Article is to clarify the
current state-of-play on the complex question of EU competence in CCP
matters after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This Article will, at
the same time, illustrate the gradual and sometimes complex nature of the
European integration process, even in an area in which the EU and its
predecessor have already made their marks. Obviously, the scope and limits
of the EU’s competences in the field of international trade are of crucial
importance, including for non-EU countries that want to understand the EU
as a partner in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations.25
II. THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY AS AN EXCLUSIVE EU
COMPETENCE
The limits of the EU’s competences are governed by the principle of
conferral,26 which means that the EU shall only act within the limits of the
competences conferred or attributed to it by the Member States in the
Treaties on which the EU is founded.27
Through the Treaty of Lisbon, external trade policy—formally called the
common commercial policy—is conferred on the EU as one of its exclusive
competences.28 When the EU’s founding Treaties confer on the Union
exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and
adopt legally binding acts in that area.29 In these fields, the Member States
are only able to act if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation
of Union acts.30
That the CCP was included in the Lisbon Treaty’s list of exclusive EU
competences did not come as a surprise. Already in 1975, the European
Court of Justice had held that the CCP was an exclusive competence of the
European Economic Community (EEC)—the EU’s predecessor.31 In
Opinion 1/75, the Court underlined that the CCP was conceived “for the
struggle between Commission and Member States.
25
This area is increasingly important as the European Commission has recently unveiled a
particularly ambitious multilateral and bilateral trade policy agenda for the EU. See Trade,
Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy As a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy,
at 15, COM (2010) 612 (Nov. 9, 2010).
26
TEU, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
27
Id. art. 5(2); Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. I-9713, para. 5.
28
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 3.
29
Id. art. 2(2).
30
Id.
31
Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1365.
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defense of the common interests of the Community” and stated that the
exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States and the Community in
this field was “impossible”:
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to
recognizing that, in relations with third countries, Member
States may adopt positions which differ from those which the
Community intends to adopt, and would thereby distort the
institutional framework, call into question the mutual trust
within the Community and prevent the latter from fulfilling its
task in the defence of the common interest.32
The exclusive nature of the CCP is the logical corollary of the customs
union that was set up by the Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the EEC.33
As prescribed by Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), customs unions have an internal and an external
characteristic.34 Internally, customs unions eliminate the duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce with respect to substantially all trade
between the constituent territories of the union.35 Externally, in relations
with third countries, customs unions apply substantially the same duties and
other regulations of commerce.36 In the EU, these criteria have been
interpreted strictly. This means that, in trade between the EU Member
States, customs duties on imports and exports, and charges having equivalent
effect, are prohibited.37 For imports from third countries, the EU has a
Common Customs Tariff (CCT).38 Individual Member States have lost the
competence to levy their own customs duties on products that are imported
from outside the EU.39 For such products from third countries, only the CCT
applies. It is fixed by the EU’s Council of Ministers, on a proposal of the

32

Id. at 1364.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 9; TFEU, supra note 2, art. 206.
34
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT]. See generally Youri Devuyst & Asja Serdarevic, The World Trade
Organization and Regional Trade Agreements: Bridging the Constitutional Credibility Gap,
18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2007) (underlining that the interpretation of GATT art. XXIV
has been the subject of long-lasting controversy).
35
GATT, supra note 34, art. XXIV(8)(a)(i).
36
Id. art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii).
37
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 30.
38
Id. art. 31.
39
Id. arts. 2–3, 31.
33
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European Commission.40 In addition to the CCT, customs unions also apply
the same other regulations of commerce to third countries.41 In the EU, this
application has given rise to the CCP.42
III. THE SECTORAL SCOPE OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY
The exclusive nature of the EU’s competence in the CCP has been clear
and accepted since Opinion 1/75.43 However, its exact scope has been the
subject of a decades-long legal and political debate that will be reviewed in
this Part.
A. The Treaty of Rome
The original EEC Treaty did not contain a precise definition of the CCP.
The relevant Article 113(1) mentioned that the CCP would be based on
uniform principles, “particularly in regards to changes in tariff rates, the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in
measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such
as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.”44 In other words,
Article 113(1) simply listed examples—in a non-exhaustive manner—of
measures belonging to the CCP. Several responsible officials within the EU
institutions have regretted this rather poor drafting.45 For instance, ClausDieter Ehlermann, then-Director General of the European Commission’s
Legal Service, lamented that “[m]ore than any other type of power, an
exclusive power requires a comprehensive definition of its ratio materiae.”46
Fortunately, the European Court of Justice initially seemed to adopt a broad,
coherent and comprehensive view of the CCP.47 In Opinion 1/78, it held as
follows:

40

Id. art. 31.
GATT, supra note 34, art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii).
42
TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 3, 207.
43
See Opinion 1/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, para. 39 (“[The Council recalled] that the exclusive
nature of Community powers in the matter of commercial policy is not in question.”).
44
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 113(1) (emphasis added).
45
Bourgeois, supra note 5, at 3; Ehlermann, supra note 5, at 147.
46
Ehlermann, supra note 5, at 147.
47
PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 16–18 (2004); Tridimas & Eeckhout, supra note 8, at 156.
41
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Article 113 empowers the Community to formulate a
commercial ‘policy’, based on ‘uniform principles’ thus
showing that the question of external trade must be governed
from a wide point of view and not only having regard to the
administration of precise systems such as customs and
quantitative restrictions. The same conclusion may be deduced
from the fact that the enumeration in Article 113 of the subjects
covered by commercial policy (changes in tariff rates, the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of
uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and
measures to protect trade) is conceived as a non-exhaustive
enumeration which must not, as such, close the door to the
application in a Community context of any other process
intended to regulate external trade. A restrictive interpretation
of the concept of common commercial policy would risk
causing disturbances in intra-Community trade by reason of the
disparities which would then exist in certain sectors of
economic relations with non-member countries.48
B. Opinion 1/94
At the end of the Uruguay Round which created the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the EU Member States contested the Community’s
competence to conclude the Round’s results in the fields of trade in services
and trade-related aspects of intellectual property protection.49 The Member
States were determined to protect their own prerogatives in the two latter
fields and rejected the exclusive competence of the Community.50 The
dispute ended up before the Court and resulted in Opinion 1/94.51 Nothing
48

Opinion 1/78, para. 45.
Pieter J. Kuijper, The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the
European Community, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 222 (1995); Peter L.H. Van den Bossche, The
European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements: Confusion and Controversy over the
Competence and Conduct of the European Community in International Economic Relations, in
IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 23 (John H. Jackson & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997).
50
Kuijper, supra note 49; Van den Bossche, supra note 49.
51
Opinion 1/94 1994, E.C.R., I-5267. The most interesting critical perspectives on Opinion
1/94 are EECKHOUT, supra note 47, at 26–34; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and
Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 763 (1995);
Nicholas Emiliou, The Death of Exclusive Competence?, 21 EUR. L. REV. 294, 294 (1996);
Meinhard Hilf, The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the WTO – No Surprise, but Wise?, 6 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 245 (1995); Pierre Pescatore, Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: Is
49
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prevented the Court from adopting a modern and dynamic approach to the
CCP, from giving a broad interpretation to the Article 113 concepts “the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements” and “the achievement of
uniformity in measures of liberalization,” and to include—at minimum—the
full range of trade in services in the CCP.52 Instead, the Court broke with its
own comprehensive view of the CCP as formulated in Opinion 1/78 and
came up with a narrow reformulation of its implied external powers doctrine
to limit the scope of the CCP to the following aspects of the Uruguay
Round’s Final Act: trade in goods (i.e., the entire GATT);53 cross-frontier
trade in services, but only where it did not involve any movement of persons,
thereby excluding from the CCP the important parts of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) involving consumption abroad,
commercial presence through a subsidiary or a branch, and presence of
natural persons abroad;54 and measures taken at the external frontiers of the
Community regarding the prohibition of the release into free circulation of
counterfeit goods, excluding practically the entire Uruguay Round’s
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property measures (TRIPs) from
the CCP.55
The Court’s Opinion was disappointing from the Commission’s
perspective because it prevented the simple extension of the traditional
Community method to the new trade topics. One of the major drawbacks of
the Court’s Opinion was that international agreements covering GATS and
TRIPs required the common accord in the negotiation and ratification by all
Member States as well as by the Community.56 To nonetheless ensure the
EU´s unity in international representation, the Court prescribed “close
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions,
both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of the
commitments entered into.”57 Recognizing the possible problems that this
There an Escape from a Programmed Disaster?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 387 (1999).
52
For the state of the legal debate on the scope of the CCP and trade in services before
Opinion 1/94, see PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 22–34 (1994); Paolo Mengozzi, Trade in Services and
Commercial Policy, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 1992: THE
LEGAL DIMENSION 223 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1993); Christiaan Timmermans, Common
Commercial Policy (Article 113 EEC) and International Trade in Services, in DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L’INTÉGRATION 675 (Francesco Capotorti et al. eds., 1987) .
53
Opinion 1/94, paras. 22–34.
54
Id. paras. 36–53, 73–98.
55
Id. paras. 54–71, 99–105.
56
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
57
Opinion 1/94, para. 108.
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could cause in the administration of the WTO Agreement and its annexes,
and underlining that such concerns were quite legitimate, the Court
nevertheless stressed that such practical considerations could not influence
its findings on the allocation of competence.58
C. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice
The Commission tried to rectify the situation during the negotiation of the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, but the result was meager.59 Article 133(5)
EC merely created a theoretical possibility for the Council, acting
unanimously, to extend the application of the CCP procedures to agreements
on services and intellectual property.60 A more substantial step toward the
integration of GATS and TRIPs competences in the CCP took place with the
entry into force of the Treaty of Nice in 2003.61 For Finnish Prime Minister
Paavo Lipponen, the issue was important:
The Community used to be a driving force in global trade
negotiations for many years. Now over 60% of all trade is in
the field of services, where the Community does not have
exclusive competence. Consequently our status as an effective
negotiator has declined dramatically. The Union must reestablish its position. We can do this only if we are able to
agree on the communitarisation of trade in services, intellectual
property and investments in the ongoing IGC.62
Still, the final version of the Finnish compromise text that found its way
into the Treaty of Nice did not lead to a formal extension of the CCP.63
Rather, it simply allowed the institutional provisions of the CCP to “also
apply to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in
58
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services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property.”64 By way of
derogation, the Treaty of Nice specified that agreements relating to trade in
cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human
health services, fell within the “shared competence of the Community and its
Member States.”65
It prescribed that, in addition to Community
decisionmaking, the negotiation of such agreements required the common
accord of the Member States and that they needed to be concluded jointly by
the Community and the Member States.66 The Treaty of Nice also
maintained that international agreements in the field of transport would
continue to be governed by specific provisions outside the CCP.67 The result
was complex and far from satisfactory to ensure an efficient and effective
EU voice in international trade diplomacy.68 In the words of Professor
Christoph Herrmann: “Sisyphus would have done a better job.”69
D. The Constitutional Treaty
The breakthrough came thanks to the new negotiating method devised for
the creation of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.70 While the
64
EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, art. 133(5). By way of derogation from the general rule
that the Council decides on CCP matters by qualified majority voting, Article 133(5)
specified, however, that the Council had to act unanimously when negotiating and concluding
an agreement in the fields of trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual property
where that agreement included provisions for which unanimity was required for the adoption
of internal rules or where it related to a field in which the Community had not yet exercised
the powers conferred upon it by adopting internal rules. Id.
65
Id. art. 133(6).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
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REV. 7 (2002); Stefan Griller & Katharina Gamharter, External Trade: Is There a Path
Through the Maze of Competences?, in EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND FOREIGN
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 65 (Stefan Griller & Birgit Weidel eds., 2002); Horst Günter
Krenzler & Christian Pitschas, Progress or Stagnation? The Common Commercial Policy
After Nice, 6 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 291 (2001); Leal-Arcas, supra note 4, at 362.
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Herrmann, supra note 68, at 7.
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(C 310) 1 [hereinafter Constitutional Treaty]. For discussion of the CCP provisions in the
Constitutional Treaty, see Jean-François Brakeland, Politique Commerciale Commune,
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previous EU Treaties were negotiated largely in secret among diplomats and
heads of state or government, the Constitutional Treaty was prepared in a
transparent manner by a European Convention.71 It was composed of
representatives of the heads of state or government, national parliaments, the
European Parliament, and the European Commission.72 The Convention’s
Working Group dealing with external relations approached the issue of CCP
competences from the angle of decisionmaking efficiency.73 It considered
the fact that not all areas of trade were subject to qualified majority voting as
an “oddity” and “an impediment to the Union’s efficiency in multilateral and
bilateral trade negotiations.”74 It therefore supported the use of qualified
majority voting in “all areas of commercial policy, including services and
intellectual property.”75 The Convention’s Praesidium, i.e. the leaders of the
Convention who guided the drafting process, translated this request by
simply incorporating trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual
property, as well as foreign direct investment, to the list of policy fields
falling under the CCP.76 The Convention also added a number of safeguards,
such as unanimous voting in a number of cases, that were further expanded
by the Member States in the Intergovernmental Conference that followed the
Convention.77 However, the general principle that the CCP had to
incorporate trade in goods and trade in services, the commercial aspects of
intellectual property, and foreign direct investment, was sealed.78

REV. 1347, 1361–64 (2003); Angelika Hable, The European Constitution and the Reform of
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E. The Treaty of Lisbon
Since the Constitutional Treaty failed to enter into force, a large part of its
content was carried over by the Lisbon Treaty effective on December 1,
2009.79 The relevant Article 207 TFEU on the CCP—which is identical to
the Constitutional Treaty’s Article III-315—defines its scope in the
following terms:
The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform
principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in
goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and
measures to protect trade such as those taken in the event of
dumping or subsidies.80
Thus, trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual property,
and foreign direct investment are fully integrated in the CCP.81 They remain
subject, however, to the specific rule that, for the negotiation and conclusion
of agreements in these three fields, the Council shall act unanimously
(instead of the ordinary decisionmaking method of qualified majority voting)
where such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required
for the adoption of internal rules.82 This requirement is less stringent than
the requirement under the Treaty of Nice that imposed unanimity for
agreements in trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual

79

Devuyst, supra note 71.
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(1).
81
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property relating to a field in which the Community had not yet exercised its
powers by adopting internal rules.83
1. The CCP Extended to Trade in Services and the Commercial Aspects
of Intellectual Property
With respect to the scope of trade in services, it is safe to conclude that all
four GATS modes of supply are now entirely covered by the CCP.84 In
Opinion 1/08, the Court indirectly confirmed this viewpoint when dismissing
a Spanish submission that the concept of trade in services would not cover all
GATS modes of supply.85 The Court added in particular that “given both its
general nature and the fact that it was concluded at world level, the GATS
assumes, as regards in particular the concept of ‘trade in
services’ . . . particular importance in the sphere of international action
relating to trade in services.”86 By analogy, it must be assumed that the CCP
coverage of commercial aspects of intellectual property encompasses the
entire TRIPs Agreement.87 That the Court looks to the GATS as of
“particular” importance in interpreting the scope of the CCP concept of trade
in services gives the CCP a dynamic nature (since the scope of the GATS
itself may evolve as a function of the negotiations at the WTO). Again, the
same reasoning should apply to the relationship between TRIPs and the CCP
concept of commercial aspects of intellectual property. Furthermore, as the
key aim of the inclusion of trade in services and the commercial aspects of
intellectual property in the CCP was to increase the EU’s efficiency and
effectiveness in the negotiation and conclusion of future agreements covering
GATS and TRIPs, it is justified and appropriate to give a dynamic, and not a
static, interpretation to the new Treaty provisions.88
In contrast with the Treaty of Nice, the CCP after the Lisbon Treaty also
fully includes trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services,
83
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and social and human health services.89 The Lisbon Treaty provides that the
Council shall act unanimously (instead of through the ordinary qualified
majority voting procedure) for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements:
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services,
where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural
and linguistic diversity; and (b) in the field of trade in social,
education and health services, where these agreements risk
seriously disturbing the national organization of such services
and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver
them.90
2. The CCP Extended to Foreign Direct Investment
While the post-Lisbon definition of trade in services and commercial
aspects of intellectual property is relatively straightforward, attempts to
circumscribe the scope of the concept of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
the CCP context has given rise to a greater variety of opinions.91 In contrast
with the commercial aspects of intellectual property, there is no explicit
requirement that FDI should be trade-related.92 While legal scholars disagree
on which types of investment measures fall within the CCP’s scope, the
European Commission has published a helpful Communication that clarifies
its official understanding of the new FDI competences.93 For the
Commission, FDI “is generally considered to include any foreign investment
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which serves to establish lasting and direct links with the undertaking to
which capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity.”94
When FDI takes the form of shareholding, this presupposes for the
Commission “that the shares enable the shareholder to participate effectively
in the management of that company or in its control.”95 The Commission
agrees with most legal analysts that this contrasts with portfolio investments
of a short-term and sometimes speculative nature, where there is no intention
to influence the management or control of the undertaking.96
Since portfolio investments do not come under the EU’s exclusive CCP
competence, legal experts like Marc Bungenberg have drawn the conclusion
that the EU would be able to conclude pure EU investment agreements based
on the CCP’s explicit exclusive competence only “if these agreements solely
cover pre- and post-establishment regulation but have no provisions on
protection, dispute resolution and expropriation with regard to portfolio
investments.”97 However, most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) cover
both FDI and portfolio investments.98 Bungenberg therefore fears that the
new CCP competence might not meet the demands of EU investors and
negotiating partners for the conclusion of comprehensive BITs.99 Other
scholars have thus suggested that full EU BITs be based on a combination of
explicit and implicit EU treaty-making powers.100 In this construction, the
EU’s implicit treaty-making competence over portfolio investment flows
from the existing TFEU provisions that, as a general principle, prohibit
restrictions on the free movement of capital and payments between Member
States and third countries.101

94

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
96
Id. at 3. For a similar perspective, see Bungenberg, supra note 91, at 41; Bungenberg,
supra note 81, at 144; Dimopoulos, supra note 81, at 110; Herrmann, supra note 91, at 3;
PIRIS, supra note 81, at 282.
97
Bungenberg, supra note 81, at 147.
98
Bungenberg, supra note 91, at 41.
99
Bungenberg, supra note 81, at 147.
100
Steffen Hindelang & Niklas Maydell, The EU’s Common Investment Policy –
Connecting the Dots, EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 1 (2011); Bungenberg, supra note 91, at 42.
101
Hindelang & Maydell, supra note 100, at 1; TFEU, supra note 2, art. 63; Martenczuk,
supra note 70, at 278. For a substantive legal analysis of the link between the EU’s provisions
on free movement of capital and investment protection, see STEFFEN HINDELANG, THE FREE
MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION IN EU
LAW 63–80, 162–200 (2009).
95

2011]

THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMPETENCE

657

The European Commission’s own approach is similar.102 Calling for a
comprehensive EU international investment policy, the Commission points
out that the Treaty’s prohibition on capital and payment restrictions covers
both direct and portfolio investments.103 While recognizing that the Treaty’s
Chapter on capital and payments does not expressly provide for the
possibility to conclude international agreements on investment, the
Commission underlines that the exclusive EU competence to conclude
agreements in this area is implied to the extent that international agreements
on investment would affect the scope of the common rules set by the
Treaty’s Chapter in question.104 In this context, the Commission refers to the
new TFEU Article 3(2) which provides:
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the
conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is
provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so
far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their
scope.105
The Commission’s viewpoint seemed to have been well received by EU’s
Trade Policy Committee, consisting of senior trade policy experts of the
Member States.106 It proposed that the EU’s Council of Ministers would
explicitly acknowledge the importance of the Commission’s comprehensive
approach to shaping the future EU international investment policy.107
Furthermore, it recommended that the Council would expressly support “the
definition of a broad scope for the new EU policy in this field as suggested
by the Commission.”108 The door for further discussion was not, however,
closed as the Trade Policy Committee also stated that the definition of the
broad scope was “to be further elaborated in full respect of the respective
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competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the
Treaties.”109
3. The CCP and the Exclusion of Transport Policy
The Lisbon Treaty did not alter the fact that the negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport remains
outside of the CCP and subject to the specific rules contained in the Treaty
Title on transport.110 Clarifying the scope of this exception, the Court held in
Opinion 1/08 that “there is no doubt that the expression ‘international
agreements in the field of transport’ covers, inter alia, the field of trade
concerning transport services.”111 In Opinion 1/08, the Court also rejected
the arguments of the Commission and Parliament that the exclusion of
agreements in transport from the scope of the CCP should apply only in the
case of agreements that are exclusively, or at the very least predominantly,
concerned with transport.112 The Commission and Parliament argued that
CCP provisions formed the appropriate legal base where provisions on
transport have a merely ancillary or secondary nature within trade
agreements.113 For the Court, such an interpretation could not be accepted,
notably because it would to a large extent deprive the transport exception
provision of its effectiveness.114
4. The Implementation of CCP Agreements and the Internal Delimitation
of EU Competences and Powers
The final paragraph of Article 207 TFEU includes the important
limitation that the implementation of the CCP may not affect the delimitation
of the EU’s (internal) competences and powers.115 It reads as follows:
The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in
the field of the common commercial policy shall not affect the
delimitation of competences between the Union and the
109
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Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of
legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so
far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.116
At first sight, this provision could be interpreted as prohibiting the
adoption of external measures under the CCP that would (a) go beyond
measures that have been or could be adopted on the basis of internal EU
competences; and (b) go into areas where internal harmonization is
excluded.117 This interpretation does not, however, sufficiently take into
account the new context of external competence under the Treaty of
Lisbon.118
First, Article 207(6) cannot be interpreted as establishing a parallelism
between internal and external competences in the sense of the Court’s
restrictive application of the implied external powers doctrine in Opinion
1/94.119 As Jan Wouters, Dominic Coppens, and Bart De Meester have
correctly underlined, Article 207(6) concerns only the CCP and this is an
area governed by explicit exclusive external competence, even in the absence
of existing internal measures.120
Second, as Markus Krajewski has convincingly demonstrated, Article
207(6) cannot be logically interpreted as prohibiting the adoption of external
measures under the CCP that would go into sectors where internal
harmonization is excluded.121 Such an interpretation would contradict the
explicit inclusion, in the CCP, of such sectors as cultural, educational, and
health services (where such internal harmonization is excluded).122
Third, Article 207(6) has meaning when it is interpreted “to delimit the
external from the internal sphere” and “to prevent the exclusive character of
116
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the powers under the CCP encroaching upon the internal delimitation of
competences.”123 Without the limitation of Article 207(6), the EU might—
via the need to implement CCP agreements in, for example, services—gain
competence to legislate in cultural, educational, and health services.124
Article 207(6) is therefore a limitation on the internal implementation of
CCP agreements. Krajewski has fittingly reformulated the provision as
follows: “The Union can only implement international agreements insofar as
it enjoys internal legislative competence. In other areas, the Union has to
rely on the Member States to implement international agreements.”125
Even in those areas where the implementation of CCP agreements is the
competence of the Member States, the coherent application of such
agreements concluded by the EU is ensured by (a) the fact that agreements
concluded by the Union are binding on its Member States;126 (b) the
obligation of the Member States to ensure fulfillment of the obligations
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union, such as international
agreements;127 and (c) the primacy of EU law over the law of the Member
States.128
IV. CONCLUSION
After several decades of political and legal struggle, the Treaty of Lisbon
has provided the EU with a primary law base that finally settled the question
of the inclusion of trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual
property, and foreign direct investment in the CCP.129 Although the Treaty
of Lisbon thus constitutes a major breakthrough for the EU’s position as
negotiator of international trade agreements, the preceding paragraphs have
shown that it not did put an end to the legal discussions on the scope of the
CCP. The precise definition of the terms “trade in services,” “commercial
aspects of intellectual property,” and especially “foreign direct investment”
will most likely be the subject of further debate and court cases.
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Furthermore, important legal questions will continue to arise on (a) the
precise delimitation of the CCP in relation to other EU policy fields such as
environment and general foreign and security policy; and (b) the choice of
legal bases for conclusions by the EU of multi-purpose agreements that
involve trade provisions, in addition to other objectives. Space constraints,
unfortunately, made it impossible to go into these issues in the framework of
this Article.130 It must be noted, however, that—much like the Court’s
general approach to external competences—its case law on the delimitation
of the CCP in relation to other policy domains has not been a major
contribution to creating legal certainty and clarity in a longer-term
perspective.131
In its Opinion 1/08, the Court recalled that concerns “relating to the need
for unity and rapidity of external action and to the difficulties that might arise
were the Community and the Member States to participate jointly in
conclusion of the agreements at issue cannot change the answer to the
question of competence.”132 In other words, the Court cannot be relied upon
to settle fundamental issues of efficiency and effectiveness of EU trade
policy. This is a matter for the Member States (and the EU institutions) to
work out in political agreements. Unfortunately, as Judge Christiaan
Timmermans observed, “[s]ometimes, one gets the impression that in
external affairs, Member States founded the Community to contest its
competences rather than to exercise them.”133 In this respect, the EU’s
competence battles on the CCP are an illustration of the constant struggle
between the general interest of the Union and the welfare of its population as
a whole and the narrowly defined, short-term self-interests of the Member
States. At the same time, the history of the CCP also shows that, as in most
other EU policy fields, Europe’s long-term evolution is one that follows the
rational road of integration.
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